“Barth’s ‘moral ontology’ ascribes more freedom and significance to the human than do the anthropological underpinnings of the ‘moral Cartesianism’ (p. 55) which has tended to dominate modern ethical reflection. On the latter view, the human subject is self-positing in a non-dependent, unqualified way. The subject creates her ‘self’ through setting and accomplishing ethical goals in the face of moral quandaries. A divine agency whose existence would qualify or determine such finite acts of self determination is seen, on this view, as hostile to human freedom. For Barth, such an understanding offers only the appearance of freedom. It celebrates in the moral agent the capacity to deliberate over ethical options and to make a ‘free’ selection among them. To deliberate in this way, however, is to take a step back, to distance oneself inwardly from a situation so as to analyze the alternatives, to weigh consequences, to calculate outcomes, and to just that extent, to make oneself a spectator. But the ‘freedom’ entailed in such a view is no freedom at all; it is, in fact, bondage. Confronted by the great ethical crises of modern times (Auschwitz!), real freedom does not consist in deliberation; it consists in the ability to recognize and do the good because one is already fundamentally engaged by it and existentially committed to it. And that only occurs—and this is the heart of Barth’s argument— where God is known, where the human agent is made by Him to be His free covenant-partner. Thus, the existence of God not only does not threaten human agents with a loss of freedom, He alone is capable of setting human beings free for real freedom.” Bruce McCormack, Review of Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation by John Webster in Modern Theology 13:2 April 1997.